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MINN. L. REV. 361 passim and Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 712, 716.
Common law negligence is irrelevant where liability is statutory. Here
liability was squarely placed by the statute upon violators of the
commission's ruling, and the court's failure to act directly under it
resulted only in needless confusion. The Arkansas legislature should
be commended for expressly setting forth its intent as to civil liability.
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 6809(a).' Such statutes would go a long
way toward clarifying and settling the law in situations where con-
fusion has resulted from the common law's clumsy attempt to keep
pace with modern developments. It is regrettable that such statutes
are rare, and it is even more regrettable when courts fail to take
advantage of them when they exist.
TRADE REGULATION
"COLA" NOT ENJOINED AS MARK OR NAME
An injunction prohibiting appellant Dixi-Cola Laboratories from
using the word "Cola" was dissolved. "Cola," used either alone or as a
suffix, is generic and descriptive and can be used only if confusion
is avoided.'
Claiming its mark2 is infringed, plaintiff here seeks to enjoin the
1Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 352 (C.C.A.
4th, 1941), cert. denied, 62 S. Ct. 60 (1941).
2 The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1938) §§ 715, 716, refers to marks as
arbitrary words adopted as technical marks and names as de-
scriptive words which have acquired a "secondary meaning." Equity
early protected marks as property, which concept it gradually ex-
panded. See Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Rep.
956 (1838). The first user of an arbitrary and fanciful (non-
descriptive and unfamiliar) word is protected in its use as a tech-
nical mark. NIMS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS (3d ed.
1929) § 51. But cf. In re Richfield Oil Co., 88 F. (2d) 499
(C.C.P.A. 1937). Analogous protection is given descriptive words
which have acquired a "secondary meaning," i.e., when their pri-
mary sense in the market refers to a particular product. RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 716, comment b; NIMS, supra § 37;
Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 YALE L.S.
1, 9. The basis of this protection is tort, though the courts have
little difficulty in discovering wrongful intent. See Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); Elgin National
Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901);
Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 55 Ind. App. 455, 464,
104 N.E. 34, 37 (1914); DERENBERG, TRADE MARK PROTECTION AND
UNFAIR TRADING '(1936) § 30; Grismore, Fraudulent Intent in Trade-
Mark Cases (1929) 27 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858.
By making a registrant of a descriptive name the prima fasie
owner, the ten-year proviso of the Act of 1905 conferred a pre-
sumption of a property right sufficient to gain equitable juris-
diction. 33 STAT. 728 (1905), U.S.C.X. 96 (1934); Charles Broad-
way Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 300 Fed. 706, 712 (C.C.A. 2d,
1924); see Liddy, Has Congress the Constitutional Power to Leg-
islate on the Substantive Law of Trade Marks? (1937) 6 FORDHA1
L. REV. 408, 412; cf. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233
U.S. 461, 470, 471 (1914); see also United States Printing &
Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156 (1929);
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use of the word "Cola" on the ground that it is so associated with
"Coca-Cola" that its use leads the public to believe that both products
emanate from the same source. Confusion of source is sufficient,s
even though the common origin is anonymous. 4 If infringement can
be shown, competitors may be enjoined from the use of the word
even though they use "Cola" without attempting to confuse.5 But
there can be no infringement unless the mark is arbirtrary or other-
wise validly registered under the Act of 1905. In deciding that "Cola"
was originally descriptive, the court denies the full protection given
a technical mark and sets aside for complainant this alternative of
protection. A name once descriptive apparently is always so, though
it may come in time to have no reference to the ingredients of the
product6
There still remains the similar protection given descriptive words
validly registered under the statute, and the limited tort protection
given non-registered descriptive words which have a "secondary mean-
ing." Neither statute nor the unfair competition doctrine can be of
protection here, for "Cola" has come to describe the products of many
competitors. 7 Due to circumstances beyond plaintiff's control, and
F.T.C. v. Kay, 35 F. (2d) 160 (C.C.A. 7th, 1929), (1930) 43
HARV. L. REv. 839; Pearne & Crotty, Trade Mark Registration and
the Lanham Bill (1941) 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 142, 150.
SThis would of course be true for technical marks. Arrow Distilleries,
Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F. (2d) 347 (C.C.A. 4th, 1941)
(opinion five days prior to principal case by same judge). It
was held likewise where the terms had a "secondary meaning."
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461 (1914);
see Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Anal-
ysis and Synthesis, 11 (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 759, 786 (deploring
the reasoning).
4 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960, 963
(C.C.A. 2d, 1918); Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 292 Fed.
264, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); NIAIS, supra note 2, at §§ 39a, 42.
GWhere complainant can show his name is arbitrary and has been
infringed, unfair competition will usually be found as well. "The
facts . . . . are substantially the same." Reed, J., in Armstrong
Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 325
(1938); accord, Moxie Co. v. Noxie Kola Co., 29 F. Supp. 167,
172 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage
Corp., 271 Fed. 600, 604 (C.C.A. 4th, 1921), cert denied, 256 U.S.
703 (1921); see Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233
U.S. 461, 470 (1914); Handler & Pickett, supra note 3, at 783
et seq.; Schechter, The Rational Basis of Tradema¢rk Protection
(1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 828.
6 Even though the product contained but 2% extract of cocoa leaves
and cola nuts it was held descriptive. United States v. Coca-Cola
Co. of Atlanta, 241 U.S. 265 (1916); Nashville Syrup Co. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 215 Fed. 527 (C.C.A. 6th, 1914); United States v. Forty
Barrels & Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 215 Fed. 535 (C.C.A. 6th,
1914) (all on misbranding). Though the ingredients have been
changed, it is still partially descriptive. Coca-Cola Co. v. Old
Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 Fed. 600 (C.C.A. 4th, 1921), cert.
denied, 256 U.S. 703 (1921).
7Cf., "Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent
or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and
in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply in-
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perhaps because of its acquiescence8 in the use of the word, the suf-
fix "Cola" 9 has lost its distinctiveness.' 0  It is immaterial that the
owner may have attempted to cut off the general use of the word,
for intent is not involved where acquiescence is the defense."
Recognition that "secondary meaning" once lost may be re-acquired
is a defensible suggestion,12 but here there has been no re-acquisition.
It is either the whole mark "Coca-Cola" 18 or the abbreviation of the
first word that serves as the goodwill agent 14 of the plaintiff.
terested." Brandeis, J., in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). Where non-functional appearance is
involved, on the other hand, the tendency has been to give pro-
tection. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 Fed. 720 (C.C.A.
6th, 1912), cert, denied, 229 U.S. 613 (1913) (coloring); J. N.
Collins Co. v. F. M. Paist Co., 14 F. (2d) 614 (E.D.Pa. 1926)(wrapper); and Hiram Walker & Sons v. Grubman, 222 Fed.
478 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (coloring). This type of confusion has
given rise to demands for legislation conferring conclusive sub-
stantive rights. See Liddy, supra note 2, at 415; Pearne and
Crotty, supra note 2 passim; Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-
mark Protection (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 60, 70.
8See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419 (1916).
One may acquiesce to one group but not to another. Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Saxlebner v.
Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Carlisle Bottling Works, 43 F. (2d) 119 (C.C.A. 6th, 1930);
Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., [1896] 2 Ch. 54, 80;
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 721, comment e, § 735 (1); NIMS,
supra note 2, at § 47 (10). Id. at § 407a distinguishes between
the defenses of laches, abandonment, acquiescence, and loss of dis-
tinctiveness. A more difficult question arises where the right to
use a mark is related to a patent termination situation or to the
honest discovery of a secret process. See Handler, Unfair Com-
petition (1936) 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 192; Note (1940) 26 IOWA IL
REV. 89.
9 On the other hand, plaintiff has never acquiesced to the use of the
word "Coca." Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S.
143 (1920).
10 It is significant that there have been 143 registrations using "Cola"
as a suffix, and that "Pepsi-Cola" has been on the market for over
thirty-five years. In addition, the Coca-Cola Co. has consented
to numerous consent decrees permitting the use of "Cola" by its
competitors.
11 Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. (2d) 75, 80
(C.C.A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936). Intent is
involved only when abandonment is the defense. Julian v. Hoosier
Drill Co., 78 Ind. 408 (1881); RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 735
(1) and comment; NIMS, supra note 2, at § 407a; Note (1930) 30
COL. L. REV. 695, 702.
12 Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F. (2d) 352 (C.C.A.
4th, 1941), cert. denied, 62 S. Ct. 60 (1941), 27 VA. L. REV. 839.
Is Complainant is entiled to the exclusive use of the words "Coca-
Cola," when used together. Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America,
254 U.S. 143 (1920); Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage
Corp., 271 Fed. 600 (C.C.A. 4th, 1921), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 703
(1921).
14 Goble, What a Trade Mark Protects (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 379
passim; Schechter, supra note 5, at 822.
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